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Abstract. This article seeks to document the vernacular perceptions of ‘globalization’ in
rural Bengal (India) and, in that connection, seeks to rethink some long-held western
notions concerning commodity, consumption, representation, the nature of sociality
and the politics of democratic empowerment in the third-world. In the subaltern
imaginary, images seem to play a crucial role conductive to empowerment. Also, far
from resisting globalization and consumption, the rural poor seems to have assimilated
these into their vernacular cosmology.
Keywords: Globalization, local/global, ‘commodity fetishism’, consumption, spectacle,
simulacrum, gift, democracy, governance, ‘Subaltern Studies’, community, personhood.
Who is afraid of Cyber-communism?
Bombard the headquarters!
A major leitmotif of disquietude about globalization in India has been
its supposed inculcation of ‘western’ consumerism to the gullible Indian
masses. This enjoys a broad-based consensus: the RSS thugs (Hindu-
Fascist storm-troopers), who routinely smash shops selling totemic
‘western’ goods like Valentine’s Day cards, are not ideologically far
removed from the Stalinist crusaders ﬁghting apasanskriti (degenerate
culture) in their Left bastion, Calcutta. Denunciation of western ‘dec-
adence’ and ‘hedonism’ (bhogbad) is a constant refrain of their cultural
propaganda, too. In this regard, the Chinese comrades (to whom the
Bengali Stalinists are closely allied), once again, have proved their
nettle. Justifying their longstanding censorship of the internet and the
crack-down on cyber-cafes, Beijing’s Vice-Mayor, Liu Zhihua, came up
with a handy aphorism: it is no longer religion but cyber-cafe which is
the ‘‘opium of the masses’’.1
qIn memoriam: Gourkishore Ghosh (1923–2001) Vernacular intellectual, publicist, crusader for
free speech and democracy
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Given this rainbow coalition against ‘the evil demon of images’, I
want to celebrate here the imaginaries of consumption in our part of the
world haunted by the specter of cyber-communism. I do this by
exploring the emergent solidarities engendered by these images, binding
ordinary people in their quotidian struggles against the State, the Party,
the World Bank, the IMF and other such self-appointed custodians of
their destiny. I locate agency in the pleasure experienced by the poor in
their enchantment by images of commodities. FromMandeville through
Marx to postmodern counter-culture gurus, desire and consumption
have consistently been viliﬁed; the experience of consumption is held to
be passive and banal, leading to a certain ‘bimboﬁcation’ of the masses.2
I argue that the critique of the so-called passivity of consumption ensues
from a messianic desire to purge society by punishing the people for
their reversion to idolatry and paganism (more on this later). I show
that this didacticism is a throw back from a hoary WESTERN fear of
representation as such whose poisoned fruits are, paradoxically, the
authoritarian regimes of Asia. I seek to unravel here the diabolical
complicity of authoritarianism with the chilling illogic of a utopian
‘beyond’ of representation.
On ‘Interobjectivity’
Before I come to my untimely meditations on the subaltern imaginaries
of consumption, allow me to elaborate on the barest minimum of an
analytical framework. My initial entry point is Appadurai’s essay on the
‘semioticity’ of things (‘‘methodological fetishism’’).3 This work is heavy
with the recognition that value is not inscribed in the things themselves.
This de-ontologisation had the consequence of reclaiming value’s inter-
subjective (or, shall I say, ‘interobjective’) face.4 Before Appadurai,
semioticity or cultural thingness was explored by a brand of semiotics
practiced by Barthes, Baudrillard etc. As Marxists, they worked hard to
peel oﬀ the ‘ideological’ layers of meaning surrounding things, hoping
to reach its kernel – a degree zero – where the thing would be equal to
itself. Released from the burden of representation, it was hoped, the
thing will reappear in its primordial clarity whose locus classicus was
laid out by the Cartesian res as modiﬁed by the Kantian ontological
bipolarity of the transcendental ego and the mute thing-in-itself. This
bipolarity is constitutive of what Latour calls the ‘‘modern’’ reality; the
‘reality’ of the thing as mere ob-ject, emerges out of this framing.5
The aim of this essay is to rid progressive politics of this imaginary of
the worldless res through which ‘‘a beyond of representation is posited
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in such a way that representation could be measured against it.’’6
‘Matter’ that matters is always-already inscribed with discourse. The
materiality implicated in the Marxist critique of ‘commodity fetishism’
understood as an ‘‘objective illusion’’, is the materiality of the res. It
demands that things be restored to their primal innocence (use-value) by
being related directly and transparently to their master, man, without
the mediation of market.7 This nostalgia for a world of simple objects is
grounded in a myth of presence, which informs much of contemporary
‘materialist’ idealism.8 It is my contention that materiality must be
understood as materiality eﬀect – the res is a worldless no-thing.
Worldly things are cyborgs9 of sorts – their existential density is wholly
due to their inscription with text. It follows that the res is a historical
eﬀect, rather than the ground of all history.10
Marx treats use-value as a mere foil to bring out the distinctive nature
of exchange-value – the artiﬁce per excellence of civil society. He wrote:
‘‘Use-value expresses a natural relationship between a thing and a man,
the existence of things for man. But exchange value represents the social
existence of things’’: use-value is nature, exchange-value is culture.11
Consequently, the work of de-naturalizing use-value and reclaiming its
socialness has to begin, of necessity, with Marx who tried to wriggle use-
value out of history. He wrote in Capital I that the history of use-value
coincides with the history of discovery of the ‘‘properties of things’’. This
‘history’ is sham because the notion that the thing is the sum total of its
physical properties is itself a product of history.
Marx takes what he calls the ‘‘sensuously varied objectivity [of things]
as articles of utility’’ as a timeless fact.12 But ‘‘facts’’ are something
‘‘constructed... and yet, once constructed... [they have] suﬃcient exis-
tence that none can deny them.’’13We come upon a scene when things are
viewed solely in terms of their ‘objective’ properties satisfying human
‘want’ – utility. I propose to treat this ‘fact’ as a social construction,
which has acquired a certain ‘durability’. Marx’s reservation about
market stems from the fact that it homogenizes the ‘natural’, sensuous
singularities of things into the regimented equivalence of exchange-
values.14 But Marx’s account of exchange-value leaves out something
crucial: the emergence, existence and uniqueness of a system of ‘goods’
subject to a common deﬁnition. Political Economy emerged when the
existence of this system was already a datum, a ‘social fact’ and, it took
this equivalence for granted. It is well-known how in the eighteenth
century there emerged the ‘double’ discourse of value – aesthetics and
political economy – both (beauty and exchange value) being founded in
contradistinction to a generalized ‘use-value’ or ‘utility’ of objects.15
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Before Political Economy, so to speak, things were organized in a moral
hierarchy and not yet normalized into a homogeneous system of ‘goods’
capable of satisfying human want. The question of equivalence was
posed in cases where conﬂict arose and judges had to decide if an item
was of satisfactory quality. The tradition dealing with this taxonomic
problem goes back to law and jurisprudence: to judge and to code both
come down to classifying a case in a legal category, or, in legal terms, to
qualifying it. Law here refers at once to the king – the judge of judges, and
to knowledge. So there is a clear link between equity and equivalence:
what was once prescriptive, pertaining to morality and law, gradually,
through repeated usage, became descriptive.16 Thus, ‘use-value’ – the
so-called qualitative character of things as things – as repository of an
original and authentic substantiality – is simply the ‘‘anthropological
alibi’’ of exchange-value.
Since both use- and exchange-values are historically contingent con-
structs, it follows that the concept of commodity itself is not ‘real’. It is a
powerful theoretical ﬁction yoked with a certain vision about the nature
of the present we inhabit. Stated categorically, the script I wish to contest
is: through the universalisation of the commodity form, the erstwhile
‘unity’ of life is torn asunder and images bereft of their referents are made
autonomous. Though ‘globalization’ is the latest phase in the career of
the commodity form, so runs the argument, the germ of this development
was present essentially in the very imaginary of commodity – in its
privileging of representation and mediation over immediacy. Given that,
that ‘‘capital [would get] accumulated to the point where it becomes
image’’ or ‘‘spectacle’’ – is simply a matter of time.17 In its post-Marxist
formulation, globalization is the culminating moment of this logic when
commodity, freed from its erstwhile territorial underpinning, becomes
autonomous and self-referential.18 Commodity de-territorialized is the
‘spectacle’ universalized. ‘‘Empire’’ is the globalization of the ‘‘society of
spectacle’’. Negri’s ‘French exile’ has been rather productive: he is still
churning the sour milk of ‘68-style (campus) radicalism!
Using this critique of the commodity form, I want to work out a non-
utopian vision of valorizing the present in reporting an incident that
took place in Calcutta in the wake of ‘globalization’. With the intent of
exploring the structural anxiety about commoditization,19 I rely not on
the angst-ridden visions of post-modern prophets, but on the lived
reality of ordinary people. I want to interrogate here their ‘take’ on
commoditization and globalization. Exploring the commodity form
through a reading of its meaning(s) as it circulates through the moral
economy of the everyday, will alert us to the possibility that commodity,
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‘‘rather than being readable as a constant function’’, should be thought
more as a ‘‘relational structure,’’ ‘‘possessing diﬀerent valences in
diﬀerent contexts’’.20
Globalization gone native: the ontology of everyday transactions
in a bengali village daan, bakhsish, dakshina and Chinese bicycles
The Production of Globality
An arresting event took place in Calcutta in May 2001.21 Truckloads of
villagers from the countryside invaded the city with the objective of
buying Chinese consumer goods. Rumor was rife that due to the lifting of
restrictions on imports, unbelievably cheap Chinese goods would be sold
at the Netaji Indoor Stadium. In early 2001, a systematic disinformation
campaign was launched by the Indian big business to create panic about
the imminent invasion of Chinese goods. The pro-business print-media
carried lead stories on what they dubbed ‘‘dumping’’ of cheap goods by
China.22 The hysteria ensuing this campaign reached such heights that
the then commerce minister had to announce in the Parliament on the
24th of February 2001 that there is no immediate threat of Chinese
dumping. What is peculiar about this rumor is that it was transmitted
through the electronic media: traders and wholesalers all over the
country received faxed messages and emails containing lists of prices.23
This rumor had generic similarity to an earlier one: the Hindu God,
Ganesh, would drink milk oﬀered by devotees on a certain day in Sep-
tember 1995.24 It is believed that this ‘miracle’ actually happened. This
new genre of cyber-rumor is a simulated hybrid: its potency derives not
from the relative indeterminacy of word of mouth, but from the cold
precision of bytes of data transmitted through silicon chips. Like the
Toyota-ridden hybrid Ratha (chariot) of Advani’s sinister Rathayatra in
199125 or the televised ancient epics of the early ‘90s, proliferation of these
hybrid signiﬁes is a deﬁning feature of India’s public culture today. These
dissolve, in a manner held to be quintessentially ‘postmodern’, the sacred
into the profane, depth into surface and, and more ominously, for the
leftistKulturkritik, the epochal divisionof theworld in a nowand a then.26
These cyber rumors are compelling instances of simulacra – a mere
‘copy’ not backed by an ‘original’ – the ‘truth’ or the ‘real’. My quarrel
with the leftist critiques of Indian public culture erupts at the point
when they seek to denude simulation of agency. Rumor is a process of
communication through which meanings are produced, transmitted and
consumed. Yet, the coding of a message may not, necessarily, control its
THE RUMOR OF GLOBALIZATION 39
reception: encoding and decoding are separate and autonomous
processes. Even with simulated cyber rumors, there remains the agentive
moment of decoding. It is from the debilitating shadow of passivity – of
consuming passively without having a share in the production of
meaning – that I want to rescue the silent majorities and the damning
metaphor of simulacra.
More broadly, my title ‘‘The Rumor of Globalization’’ seeks to
capture the wider historical unease surrounding globalization – not just
a process out there, but also discourses and projects centered around a
contested topas, a ﬁgurative ‘place’ in rhetorician’s sense of the term.
Viewed through the prism of this rumor, in that place, unfolds a war of
dreams. Critical studies of globalization phrase it as a totalizing process
involving a kind of ‘economic’ rationality which is devoid of agency –
the inhuman, ‘fantastic’ logic of ‘things’ come to impose itself on what is
directly lived – human ‘belonging’ which is necessarily local, autoch-
thonous, resistant and unmediated by representation. It is my conten-
tion that globalization is also an imaginary; it is imagined through
metaphors, narratives, and rumors; even its moments of violence are
mediated by structures of meaning. These meanings are constitutive of
‘globalization’ and not simply its ﬂip side or ideological chimeras that
mask forms of oppression that are external to them. Finance, interest
rates, market, tariﬀ and regulations emerge from a discursive process
because the ‘economy’ itself is a re-presentation, and not the ‘real’ world
itself. If the local is ‘constructed’, ‘produced’, so to speak, by what
Appadurai calls the work of ‘‘social imagination’’, so is the ‘global’.
Surely, ‘globalization’ is not One: it is many visions. It is, precisely, a
war of contesting visions. To illustrate with our ‘rumor of globaliza-
tion’: what was meant to create the semiotic condition of dread, panic
and foreboding, as evident from the articles in cold print, turns into a
jubilant state of expectancy for arrival of cheap consumer goods which
have been denied to the Indian masses.
I want read the ﬁgure of globalization against the grain, against one
of the most inﬂuential strands of contemporary thought concerned with
the politics of location – namely, the work of Appadurai.27 His con-
tribution has been in de-ontologising the ‘local’ – in initiating the
analysis of how the local is constructed by the global forces in a radically
‘delocalized’ world. In his reckoning the ‘local’, far from being the site
of a plenitude of meaning, turns out to be a mere eﬀect – caught, as it
were, in the interstices of an omnipresent Global. I want to critique the
localism of this globalization speak and its metropolitan myopia.
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Appadurai’s rightly asserts that locality is the ﬁgural eﬀect of
cultural–social production. It is performed, produced, rather than
being something simply given. Yet, this thinking about locality in the
performative is not extended to the ‘global’. Granted that the ‘local’ is
produced; but then, by the same logic, one should admit that the ‘global’
is also ‘produced’. At the very least, one cannot take the ‘global’ as some
kind of an ontological ground. Besides, isn’t theGlobal – a certain global
– strictly localized in the North? Wanting to bring in a dash of dialogism
into what is no more than a tame metropolitan project – ‘global civil
society’ – in a recent essay on ‘grassroots globalization’, Appadurai
makes a case for the funded NGOs as those who, proverbially, think
global but act local.28 He identiﬁes these as the agency who would ensure,
not just our deliverance from the clutches of the ‘‘predatory’’ nation-
state, but also the promotion of a more holistic, ‘from below’, counter-
vision of globalization – acting as a buﬀer against the corrosive eﬀects of
hyper-mobile ﬁnance capital. By evacuating the local political processes
altogether as transforming sites, he misses the point that what metro-
politan funding begets are oligarchies run by operators with no grass-
roots accountability. The very real danger inherent in the NGO path is
that of depoliticization though their studied indiﬀerence to larger
questions of class-domination and property ownership. Seeking to
supplant rather than supplement the local institutions and being pro-
duced through metropolitan ﬁat rather than broad-based democratic
process, their very gesture – cannily but outlandishly condescending – is
questionable. To the extent they seek to enforce a certain transnational
governmentality – management of things rather than government of men
– their locale is circumscribed by the locution called the North.29
It is thus perfectly legitimate to think of this ‘global’ as no more than
a localized vision whose production requires work of all sorts, including
the ideological work of propagating a certain Eurocentric ‘cosmopoli-
tanism’.30 One cannot be a constructivist while talking about locality
and simultaneously, a realist when thinking globality. The ﬁrst cos-
mopolitan among modern philosophers, Kant, clearly stated that cos-
mopolitanism is necessarily a Weltanschaung – ‘world-view’, even an
ethical project, but never an ontological ground.31 This is not to invoke
the lurid alterity of a resistant local as some kind of a ‘‘primeval com-
munity’’, as a ‘‘preexisting ontologicai entity’’32 but simply to point out
that we need to strive for a truly global view of globalization as opposed
to the parochialism implicated in the project of ‘global civil society’.
Besides, it is not always autochthony which scripts the local. If we give
up the habit of thinking in terms of a ‘‘pre-given world of separate and
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discrete ‘‘people and cultures’’ and see instead a diﬀerence-producing set
of relations, we turn from a project of juxtaposing preexisting diﬀer-
ences to one of exploring the construction of diﬀerences in the historical
process.’’33 This is what I set out to do here while studying a case – the
production of globality in a speciﬁc site: namely, a Bengali village near
Sabang in West Midnapore in India.34
To get on with the incident of the rumor in Calcutta. Arriving at the
Stadium early in the morning, the villagers have queued up like disci-
plined soldiers. By ten o’ clock, the unnerved administration deputed
cops in riot gears to disperse the crowd. They declare over loudspeakers
that no such ‘Sale’ is scheduled to take place but in vain. At about 12, the
impatient crowd threatened to smash the gates. In order to avoid trou-
ble, the gates were opened. Representative went inside the Stadium and
reported back to their folks. Convinced that the venue has been shifted to
prevent them from buying the cheap ‘‘foren’’ (foreign) goods in limited
supply and that the administration had connived with the rich to corner
the goodies for themselves, the disappointed crowd left with bitterness.
Later, by chance, I meet some of these people in a remote village of
Midnapore. They came to Calcutta to buy Chinese bicycles, a meton-
ymy for mobility in rural Bengal (a standard Indian bicycle costs
Rs. 1200 while a Chinese one with gears was supposed to cost only
Rs. 500), What emerged as crucial about their understanding of the
Chinese goods is the category of ‘gift’ in the very special sense they
attributed to it. They called these goods ‘‘globalizationer daan’’ (gift of
globalization) when I was chiding them for their credulity. Daan in
Bengali (derived from Sanskrit dana) means gift.
I do not wish to revisit here the vast ethnographic literature gener-
ated in the wake of Mauss’s The Gift.35 Leaving traditional Melanesia
apart, which bears little resemblance to my rural Bengal which has
voted a Communist party to power for the last 25 years, I ﬁnd it diﬃcult
to locate an analogue in the ‘hard’ ethnographic literature on ‘gift’ to
make sense of ‘‘globalizationer dann’’. A distant parallel is found in the
early work of Taussig about devil worship.36 However, his model of
fetishism in which western consumer goods play the role of fetish in the
literal sense of the term (animated objects), is inappropriate here since
there is nothing ‘magical’ about our Chinese goods. Why ‘gift’ then,
since one must pay money to acquire these?
I hope a tentative answer emerges from my diminutive ethnography.
At the heart of the Marxist theory of the commodity, there is a gener-
alized denunciation of the present as the abstract time of capital as
opposed to an ‘earlier’, ‘cyclical’ time lived by ‘communities’. The series
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of binary oppositions – capital/community, use-/exchange-value,
self-interest/altruism – inheres in the commodity/gift opposition. The
apparent clarity of the contrast between the two very diﬀerent forms of
social life of things has made it integral to the more general logic that
opposes tradition to modernity. But just as that opposition, rather than
representing a clear-cut temporal rupture, turns out to be a form of
mythical thinking in which the moment of rupture is endlessly repeated,
so too, on closer examination, do the concepts of gift and commodity
seem to partake of each other: shrewd calculations underlie the
mutually obligating gift and, commodities turn out to be constantly
endowed with non-commodity, ethical meanings.
After the expression ‘‘globalisationer daan’’ was thrown up in course
of conversation, I was waiting in suspended animation for some sup-
plementary statements. To my utter dismay, the villagers went on and
on talking about local politics: breathtaking stories of corruption by the
cliques formed around the various panchayat bodies dominated by the
ruling Communist Party of India (Marxist). These local stories were
complemented by more fantastic stories of grafting, bribery and nepo-
tism of the leading leaders of the ruling party quoted from the news-
paper Bartaman, which specializes in sensational journalism and was
backing Mamata Banerjee, the leader of the opposition party, Trinamul
Congress (TMC) – largely a front for the lumpen proletariat – on the
eve of the 2002 assembly election. Before the election, the TMC was
riding a sudden ‘wave’ of popularity induced by media-hype though
was routed subsequently through electoral debacle.
Since the ethnographer’s job is to listen, I sit in a kind of bored trance,
growing increasingly restive with their discordant stories. To break out
of the stalemate, I decide to argue with the villagers. I tell them that I am
not a gullible outsider. I vote the Communists because they are the only
force committed to grassroots democracy and empowerment of the poor.
Corruption notwithstanding, one must not forget about the wider soci-
ety which has beneﬁted from leftist rule. Before the left came to power,
the question of grassroots corruption could not arise: money started
percolating down to the village level only after the panchayat (elected and
autonomous village civic bodies) system was introduced. This historic
step towards decentralisation was further exacerbated by grass-roots
land reforms (Operation Barga). So, their keenness in discussing cor-
ruption and local politics is welcome and through such grassroots
critique, someday, corruption will give way to a transparent adminis-
tration. But we must not throw away the baby with the bath-water.
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My little speech failed to produce the desired eﬀect – I found
incomprehension writ large on the faces of my audience. The problem
seemed to be rooted in the semantic ambiguity of the term ‘‘wider
society’’ (brihattaro samaj). What ‘society’ was I talking about? Was I
talking about sikshito samaj (a common expression in subaltern Bengali
speech, meaning ‘the posh, educated lot’)? It is true that the salaried
middle class has ﬂourished under left rule, but what about their samaj ?
My plea that transcending this or that samaj, there is a ‘wider-society’,
fell on deaf ears. The villagers failed to understand what I called an
overarching, ‘wider society’, and we plunged into a dense discussion
about samaj, person (lok) and self-other (apan-par, nijer/parer). I meant
to tell them that they are parochial; a person must relate directly with
society and not just with one’s own kin or neighbors. They point out
that this is impossible. How can a person be like a solitary, stand-alone
‘‘light-post’’ [lamp-post]? Are they humans or insects (‘‘lok na pok?’’)
How immediate relationships can be so cut and dry (‘‘lepa-poncha’’) as
to be mediated through the abstract protocol of some ‘wider society’? I
think of relations as something ‘‘I’’ enter into, as after the fact of my
personhood, while they think of relations (not in the abstract but very
concretely as atmiya-swajan and para-porshi) as constitutive of their
personhood. No wonder the villagers think of what I called ‘wider
society’ as a bookish jargon.
It turns out that these villagers’ practices of life neither presuppose
nor evince, after the fact, anything like ‘society’ and its corollary,
‘individual’. Hence, the search for ‘‘the relationship’’ between the two is
misleading. What has been called ‘‘clientelism’’is precisely a gloss on this
phenomenon – the fact that voting and mobilization patterns in Indian
politics do not evince the individual as the basic unit of decision-mak-
ing.37 Pundits of Indian politics talk of ‘ascriptive’38 rather than ‘asso-
ciative’ community in explaining the phenomenon of ‘bloc voting’ where
people vote on the basis of caste, community or other so-called ‘pri-
mordial’ loyalties. The recent NGO interventions in devising novel
forms of credit customized to serve the very poor also demonstrates this.
The spectacular success of ‘micro-ﬁnance’ – where a group as a whole
stands as collateral for debts incurred by its members – reveals a pattern
of behavior grossly at odds with the received notions of personhood,
property and agency.39
The Bengali word for sociality, samaj, resists translation. All the
authoritative dictionaries of Bengali language assert that samaj is
primarily an assembly representing a particular jati of a particular
locality.40 It also means a particular and localized group of people or a
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face-to-face milieu. The root meaning of samaj is a contingent congre-
gation – a coming together of people for a speciﬁc purpose. It is an
event, even a performance but never a thing, as in Durkheimian ‘society’
– a putative anthropological constant.
In recent times, anthropologists have attempted to interrogate the
category of ‘society’: it is no longer thought as a condition humana.
Strathern set the agenda when she asked rhetorically: ‘‘In what kind of
cultural contexts do people’s self-description include a representation of
themselves as society?’’41 In social theory, inﬂuenced by Charles Taylor
and Castoriadis, Poovey (among others) has attempted a deconstruction
of the ‘social’: the kind of durability and autonomy it has acquired in
the west is shown to be a part of the long process of reiﬁcation that we
call modernity.42
The Bengali debate on samaj goes back to the end of the 19th century
and is still smoldering. The debate was shaped by concerns arising out
of the vicissitudes of colonial modernity. With the deepening of the
Western inﬂuence, the development of the modern institution of
‘society’ (understood in the Arendtian sense of a middle-ground
between the family/kinship institutions and the state) implicated in the
growth of various civic institutions in late-nineteenth century Calcutta,
did not go unnoticed by indigenous thinkers like Rabindranath Tagore.
Also, this was the period when what we now call, after Foucault, a
certain ‘governmentalisation’ of the colonial state was under way. To
the swadeshi thinker, this appeared as an encroachment on the domain
of the samaj and a radical departure from the erstwhile ideal of a polity
governed largely by self-regulated institutions centered on kinship. In
his famous Swadeshi Samaj (Indigenous Society) (1904) Tagore upheld
the ideal of a self-subsistent, resistant ‘samaj’ autonomous from the
state (the samaj/state divide being homologous to the larger paradig-
matic nationalist inside/outside divide) as the diﬀerencia speciﬁcia of
‘our’ polity as opposed to the embeddedness of the state in European
polities.43 He also made it clear that person-concept in samaj is rela-
tional. But traditional ‘Hindu’ or Indian society (I use the word now in
a purely descriptive sense), by its very constitution, consisting of
numerous samajs at diﬀerent levels, is not something that can act to-
gether ever as one body. The very nature of samaj sociality that operates
by diﬀerentiation, will prevent this. What holds it together is not soli-
darity or sociability in the western sense but the symbolic eﬃcacy of a
very lose ethic called dharma. So, while Tagore was right in stressing
relationality of persons and autonomy of the traditional samajs from
state, he was wrong in thinking that relationality can be used to forge an
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eﬀective unity – swadeshi samaj – to promote the cause of indigenous
unity against the colonial state. Cultural facts, as Geertz noted, are
always already interpretations.
To be more precise, if the erstwhile samajs had to combine into a
bloc, nothing less the transformation of the very nature of its sociality
would be called for. In fact, I suspect, the transformation of the sociality
of samaj into that of society was the hidden agenda of Bengali
modernity. But I cannot substantiate this here for obvious reasons.44 I
can only note in passing that Tagore’s project of activating the swadeshi
samaj or the nationalist project of constructing a resistant ‘inside’, was a
historic attempt to forge a social body – ‘society’ – ex nihilo. However
tentative and tenuous was this ‘society’, it was an entity – a ‘thing’ – that
was acted upon in nationalist mobilizations (especially after Gandhi)
against the colonial state. To the extent pedagogic nationalism was
successful, this imaginary institution of ‘society’ was not a mere ﬁgment
of elite imagination: repeated enactments performed it.
Some of Tagore’s contemporaries did recognize that the model of
swadeshi samaj whose professed aim was to consolidate samajs vis-a`-vis
the colonial state, goes against the very grain of the sociality of the
samajs. Strong objections about Tagore’s project came from the ‘tradi-
tionalist’ lobby (in their mouthpiece, Bangabasi, the conservative Bengali
journal) – the last bastion of what was still left of the samajs and their
garrulous, reactionary samajpatis.45 They accused Tagore of subverting
the traditional samaj order by his tendentious depiction of swadeshi
samaj as somekind of a me´lange. If samaj becomes an homogenous
collectivity, deﬁning itself as a uniﬁed bloc vis-a`-vis the state, the prin-
ciple of samaj, that which holds it together – dharma (read caste and
hierarchy) – will be undermined and an European-style ‘society’ will
triumph. We might add here that the traditional discourse of samaj
immanent in our regulative smriti texts never posited an environment-
like society and its bond, sociability.
As I have said, I cannot aﬀord to narrate here the history of trans-
formation of Bengali sociality – the transformation of samaj into
‘society’. But the very real existence of the ‘unequal’ languages in con-
temporary Bengal – the villagers’ incomprehension of my ‘wider society’
– indicates the tenacious underground persistence of samaj and the still
tenuous nature of the institution of ‘society’. To be fair to Tagore, it
should be mentioned that elsewhere, in a diﬀerent context, he did admit
that until recently (we are in 1894), we were a ‘‘samaj of householders’’.
Which is to say, there was no middle-ground between the household and
the state: there was no ‘society’. What I have said so far should make it
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abundantly clear that samaj cannot be posited even as a weak substitute
of society. Samaj is not only not society, it is something else altogether.
Largely due to the operations of colonialism, ‘‘A new ﬂood has swept
into its [samaj’s] domain. Its name is ‘the public’ [original in English]...
It is impossible to translate it into Bengali.... Now our samaj consists
not only of households but also an emergent public.’’46
To bring out the nature of sociality of samaj, it would be instructive
to contrast it with the notion of ‘community’ preached by the inﬂuential
‘‘Subaltern Studies’’ group of historians. ‘Community’ was salvaged
from the dusty alcove of 19th century historical sociology and is simply
the binary opposite of ‘association’. I ﬁnd ‘community’ unhelpful for
dethroning the concept of person qua individual idealized in Western
political theory. In Partha Chatterjee’s acclaimed The Nation and Its
Fragments, ‘community’ is presented as a critique of methodological
individualism. Using the origin-myth of a subaltern Bengali sect as a
‘cultural critique’ of liberalism, Chatterjee idealizes the image of society
as an organic body (Gemeinschaft) of which the various jatis are inter-
dependent parts. This organicism of Gemeinschaft is contrasted with
the unsocial sociability of civil society. And yet, his very posing of the
problem of sociality in terms of a putatively ‘universal’ problem of ‘‘the
unity of mutual separateness and mutual dependence’’ (his words) of
persons47, suggests as if there is an axiomatic context of action every-
where and, has the eﬀect of making ‘society’ a universal, removing the
very possibility of eliciting other socialities. So long as individuals are
imagined as conceptually distinct from the relations that bring them
together, we would not be able even to raise the problem of the sociality
of samaj.
Chatterjee’s ‘community’ takes its ﬁnal shape through a reworking of
Hegel’s section on ‘‘Ethical Life’’ in The Philosophy of Right as a
‘suppressed’ narrative of the ‘community’. He argues for an ethical
priority of the organicism of kinship over the principle of bourgeois
equality. The underlying argument is familiar: before that historic sep-
aration of man from what Marx called ‘‘the original conditions of
production’’, society was an organic whole immersed in a time before
representation. Enveloped in ‘custom’ people experienced ‘nature’ and
themselves in an unmediated immediacy (‘‘irreducible immediacy’’48),
till market and commodity, the forces of bu¨rgerliche Gesellschaft (civil/
bourgeois society) that is, raised their ugly heads, alienating people from
nature and from themselves. This is, famously, the Left-Hegelianism of
the Marx of 1844: Schiller’s Romantic theory of alienation ampliﬁed
and then projected on a world-historical scale.49 It is also a historic
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regression from Hegel; for, the Feurebachian ‘species love’ implicated in
this mythic humanist narrative derives heavily from the notion of aes-
thetic interiority developed by the German Romantics and their reac-
tionary politics of nostalgia.
Capitalism means progressive commoditization. But, and this is
crucial, the ineluctable logic of commodity also engenders the empha-
tically de-commodiﬁed domain of family, love and friendship as a kind
of paradoxical counter-movement.50 ‘Love’ in Hegel’s sense does not
predate commodity but is contemporaneous with it. Thus, the question
of an ethical priority of what Derrida calls philia over impersonal
contractual relationships is simply misconceived.51 What Chatterjee
chooses to valorize belongs to the very same metaphysics of bourgeois
personhood deriving from the interconnected notions of primordial
self-ownership, the idea of property as a right of exclusion of others
and the Romantic notion of ‘authorship’ – coalescing in the notion of
an originary proprietary right in one’s own self and its activities.52
Precisely what seems to resist most the alienating logic of commodity –
viz., the idea of a self-determining, unique, moral person who owns his
‘own’ works – is, paradoxically, a singular creation of bourgeois law.
So, to make a political agenda out of the unmediated ‘immediacy’ of
‘community’, is what Carl Schmitt called, in a somewhat diﬀerent
context, ‘‘Political Romanticism’’.53 Consequently, the ‘outside’ of
commodity is not the ‘ethical life’ enshrined in the primordial, ‘organic’
community.
Outside-inside the commodity machine
Personhood (to be a lok) for my villagers is a result of ‘‘transactions’’,
the two axes of which are apan (kin) and par (non-kin). The commu-
nitarian ideas I imbibed made me think that the bond of community is
the connector between persons and society and further, society is a
matter of collectivity. This has the distinct disadvantage of prioritizing
‘society’ as an a priori, as a reality sui generis (as Durkheim would say),
which is never accounted for. In the life-world of my villagers, ‘‘single
actors are not thought ... [as] indivisible, bounded units; .... Instead...
persons are... thought... to be ‘‘dividuals’’ or divisible.’’54 Viewed thus,
the villagers ‘‘exhibit an elaborate transactional culture, characterized by
explicit, institutionalized concern for giving and receiving of many kinds
in kinship, work, ... worship’’ and, I hope to show, even in politics.55
The upshot of this is that, both persons and things are produced by
exchange or transactions (whereas commodity is produced for
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exchange). People’s work in such cultures is not to sustain ‘social’
relationships through ‘reciprocation’. What people must do is to place
constraints on the webs of relationships. For the villagers, non-kin
(par) relationships are based on solidarities which can be very contin-
gent and ﬂuid as well as long-lasting and durable. Here are some
examples of non-kin socialities: swajati – members of one’s own jati;
those who participate in an adda in a tea-shop, who organize together to
celebrate a barwari puja, who follow a religious guru like Baba Loke-
nath, who follow a speciﬁc neta, village fractions formed around various
interests, customs, events and agendas. All these are little samajs – even
the group of daily passengers commuting to Calcutta by train in
‘Midnapore Local’ who chant auspicious Harinam to elevate the
monotony of a long journey, is called a samaj. The singular person is a
derivative of multiple identities – a social microcosm. In Bengali, there is
a name for this mode of social action activating intricate networks of
cross-cutting solidarities in which people are enmeshed: daladali
(translated usually as factionalism). It may not be a bad descriptor of
subaltern Bengali sociality as such which, whatever it is, is emphatically
not a collective sociability. In so far as ‘social action’ is concerned,
collective life is a unity while singular persons are composite.
I have asserted that exchange produces people as persons and things
as gifts. This ‘gift-economy’ must not be conﬂated with reciprocity or
some generalized altruism. I argue that in India an underground gift
culture still governs the informal economy involving the disenfranchised
poor (Chatterjee’s ‘political’ as opposed to ‘civil’ society), and that too,
in complicity with the market and the state.56
The Bengali expression payee dewar rajniti, meaning a perverse,
paternalistic politics, has come into usage during the last 25 years or so.
This expression captures with great penetration the kind of negotiations
that take place between the villagers and the various civic-governmental
institutions. Public goods and facilities (roads, wells, public buildings,
electricity, tap-water, hospital etc.) are inevitably seen as ‘gift’. Such
gifts of unnayan (development) are given to chosen peoples and localities
(in exclusion of others) through the mediation of the big men (neta,
dada) with ‘inﬂuence’ (their word) – power-brokers at various rungs.
There is a category of goods for which the oﬃcial nomenclature in
Bengali is khayrati (alms-giving) – e.g., ‘relief’ after natural calamities,
ad-hoc schemes to provide residential houses and pukka privy, ‘food-
for-work’ schemes etc. These often come directly stamped with the name
of the ‘donor’ (e.g., Indira Abas Yojona, Jawahar Rojgar Yojona, Rajiv
such and such Yojona, Prime Minister’s Scheme for this or that) and
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these schemes are announced from the ramparts of the Red Fort by the
Prime Minister in his Independence Day speech. Access to these, getting
a ‘ration’ or a BPL card (for access to state-subsidized goods and
various other concessions), inclusion in various governmental schemes
as beneﬁciaries, admission of patients to state-run hospitals and even
formal registration of a complaint in the police station - all these require
mediation of biggies who demand loyalty and who have access to
elected representatives, to government oﬃcers, to police, to press etc.
This loyalty is political capital: if you have taken favor, you will have to
pay it back – by voting the candidate your big man favors, by joining
political rallies, by campaigning for particular candidates etc. The big
man will capitalize on the number of men he can mobilize. This is how
‘vote banks’ work, leading to ‘bloc’ voting. This intricate mesh of loy-
alty, favor and patronage extends from the grassroots to the top. And so
does the ﬂows of favors, gifts, obligations and counter-gifts.
The unoﬃcial state, the real state that touches the lives of millions in
India, is made sense of, and reciprocally, the state has to operate, of
necessity, in terms of this ‘moral economy’ – what Mauss called the
‘‘antiquated and dangerous gift economy’’.57 Yet, there can be no ‘gift’
in the realm of the modern, governmentalised state. If gift of com-
modities does emerge as a strategy of governance it is because the
modern, ‘modular’, state still does not rule over all the sectors of our
lives: there are other authorities. Thus, there is space for other socialities
not pre-empted by the ‘social’; there are other, dissonant temporalities
diﬀerent from ‘‘the time of the states’’.58 And, there are other thingings,
imaginaries of cultural thingness not exhausted by the subject-object
idiom of property and possession. It is in this allochronic time and
allotopic place, the threshold between two diﬀerent social lives of things
– that of gift and commodity – becomes porous and negotiable. When
commodities are inscribed with other, vernacular diacritics, as in the
villagers’ expression globalizationer daan, they become gift. It is not a
case of indeterminacy of social trajectory of things but of multiple
determinations, of over-determination. Thus, commodity here has
another history not annulled by its life qua commodity. It is to this
history that we must turn.
To ponder on the villagers’ cultural rationalization of commodity qua
‘daan’. It is not just a straightforward desire for imported commodities.
On closer examination, it turns out, they were not only wanting things
but also wanting people to behave in certain ways. They came up with
two key indigenous categories: subidha (privilege) and adhikar (literal
meaning, right). The latter, like the word ‘globalization’, has crept into
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their vocabulary from leftist grassroots propaganda. By adhikar, a rather
formal word, usually found in sadhu bhasa, they mean something like
‘oﬃcially sanctioned’, ‘formal’, and not ‘right’ in the juridical sense of
the term. With the experience of just-held election in mind when massive
rigging took place in Midnapore, they said that casting vote is an adhikar
but, as things stand, this adhikar, like the adhikar of buying a commodity
at ‘fair’ price, is rarely allowed to be exercised. Hence, these are adhikar
only in name; for ordinary villagers like them who are outside the
transactional network of the ruling party, these are subidha. Illustrative
examples were subsidized kerosene, sugar, grain, ‘relief’ materials dis-
tributed through the panchayats and public goods like tube-wells, roads
etc, My villagers inevitably end up paying much more than the oﬃcial
subsidized price for things like kerosene and the beneﬁciaries of the
development and welfare programs are invariably those who are part of
the coterie formed around the big-men of the panchayat. The same is
true for fertilizer, seed, pesticide and even allopathic medicines. To get
unadulterated, ‘‘original’’ (original) stuﬀ, as they call it in their pidgin
English, one has to pay a little extra, which they call, euphemistically,
dakshina (literally, remuneration paid to the priest for performing puja).
Even the police station will not accept a complaint for a common theft
without some bakhsish (tip). A quality bicycle at an easy price, with no
palms to grease, is therefore a daan from ‘globalization’. But the ruling
party in the state, for their own narrow vested interests, is trying to
malign ‘globalization’ as is evident from their extensive campaigns
against the Dunkel proposal, ‘globalization’ and the GATT in recent
past. Thus, my villagers inhabit an everyday permeated by the archaic
patterns of obligation – those dangerous, ﬂuid, subtle generosities that
bind persons into an order of relations diﬀerent from the contractual
rationality of commodity – and from which they cannot be easily
extricated. The coercive cosmopolitanism enshrined in the neo-liberal
creed is ‘‘founded on a conformist sense of what it means to be a
‘‘person’’ as an abstract unit of cultural exchange’’.59 The mutually
obligating gift makes the sense of dwelling of my villagers ontologically
diﬀerent from the neo-liberal habitus. In the vernacular imagination, the
putative ‘beneﬁts’ of globalization are conceived as ‘daan’ i.e., mediated
by the ethic of mutually obligating transactions. Can ‘globalization’
contain its own spectre – this plague of media-mediated imagination
fermenting at the hearts of the world’s dispossessed?
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Leftist propaganda and the education of desire
Though ‘fetish’ in Taussig’s sense is grossly inapplicable here, surely the
Chinese bicycle is a place-holder, a substitute-object for their deep and
repeatedly frustrated desire to participate in the political process as
digniﬁed right-bearing citizens, as subjects of a welfare-state entitled to
enjoy the beneﬁts of state-subsidized goods as a matter of right, to
participate in the global marketplace as consumers free from the
restrictions imposed by a paternalist state. These bicycles are better seen
not as passive consumables at all but rather as compressed
performances – as scripts for political action.
The point is, these desires are not innate, they were produced. These
are not, what Chatterjee called, in another context, the ‘‘desire for
democratization’’ of the subaltern masses – their timeless longing for
‘autonomy’.60 Critiquing the elite ideology of caste as a legitimizing
narrative for the appropriation of the labor of the low-castes, he claims,
by recourse to the contending ‘subaltern’ narratives that these, staying
within the cosmology of caste, ‘‘attempt to deﬁne a claim of proprie-
torship over one’s body, to negate ... [its] daily submission ... and its labor
to the ... dominant dharma and to assert a domain of bodily activity
where it can... disregard those demands.’’61 This feat of absent-mind-
edness with which the Lockean self-ownership is imputed to Bengali
subalterns, deserves notice. The idea of self-ownership is not a ﬁxed
ontological position to ground ethnographic descriptions but is itself a
construct which should be read from the materials and not into them.
Such received forms of subjectivity are straightjackets of identity.
Chatterjee’s ontology of autonomy crucially hinges on the formation of a
sovereign, transcendental, agentive, bourgeois subjectivity. Yet, there is
no transcendental normative ground on which to glorify ‘autonomy’ in
general. So, if there is a case for ‘‘desire’’ in Chatterjee’s expression, it is
his pedagogic desire to divest them of agency as desiring persons.
I want to look into desire’s artifactuality, its constructedness and its
contingency. I want to interrogate how desires are produced. This
particular desire for ‘democratization’ metonymically related to the
Chinese bicycles was produced: ﬁrst, by Leftist rule which made these
villagers political subjects but did not confer on them the accoutrements
and entitlements of citizenship. And next, by the ‘rumor of globaliza-
tion’, by which I mean the dissemination of a technologically mediated
imaginary through media in which is included not just the media hype
surrounding the imminent invasion of Chinese goods, but also their
prolonged exposure to what they call an iconic ‘‘foren’’ (meaning the
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US-American and European) lifestyle through cable television and
video (most villages have video-parlors screening all kinds of ﬁlms:
Bengali, Hindi, dubbed Hollywood ﬁlms like Titanic and Jurassic Park,
and clips of B-grade foreign ﬁlms, usually ‘adult’ scenes), but also the
(negative) leftist vernacular propaganda in the countryside against
globalization, warning people that soon cheap mass-consumption goods
of everyday use will ﬂood India at the detriment of indigenous indus-
tries. Acknowledging the spectrality of consumerist desires, mediated
through the images simulated by the technologies of communication, is
commonplace today; but it is rarely appreciated that the very same
spectre also fuels formation of new solidarities centered on new desires.
The villagers think of ‘globalization’ as a process operating from
some nether region of the world, involving posh, white, educated people
who want the underprivileged Indians to enjoy the same access to
quality consumer goods as they do. The central government in Delhi has
been agreeable to ‘globalization’ after protracted negotiations – after
being threatened of being thrown out of the world community. But the
ruling party of this state, for their own narrow vested interests, is trying
to malign ‘globalization’. The drift of their argument is that enjoying
‘right’ (adhikar) itself is a ‘privilege’ (subidha). The Leftist regime
inculcated in them the rhetoric of ‘right’ through their initial mobili-
zation around the issue of recording the names of the poor share-
croppers. That was the ﬁrst gift of ‘right’. Then came the gift of
panchayat, resulting in improved village infrastructure and enhanced
accessibility to ‘gifts’ from the state. But then, the same Leftists started
deriving special privileges out of the system, now narrowly constricted
into a coterie. Thus the desire for democratization I am concerned with
resulted from the Leftist pedagogy of ‘right’ (‘‘Adhikar keu diye day na,
adhikar ladai kore chinye nite hoy’’ – a popular Leftist slogan) as
modiﬁed by wily popular understanding: this right to right is domesti-
cated as ‘gift’ from the Leftist regime which presupposes calculation
from both the donor and the recipient. The gift of this ‘right’ must be
paid back and matched by the obligation to vote the Left and bring
them to power. Exactly the same is true for the ‘gift of globalization’: it
entails the potential recipients to enter into a sticky moral obligation
with ‘globalization’, which means, minimally, denouncing leftist
propaganda against globalization as hogwash. Thus, the Chinese bicycle
is both a commodity (since it has been produced for exchange, one has
to pay a price) and a gift (since it is produced by exchange between the
villagers and the globalization process).
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On the banality of the evils of commodity fetishism: enchantment,
fetishism, location
It is clear that some kind of enchantment is implicated in my villagers’
desire for imported consumer goods. Taussig would have us believe that
the world’s dispossessed attaches a negative valence to the spectral:
precisely because these are enchanting, these are also dangerous. There
is an easy conﬂation here between Marx’s aesthetic-anthropological
critique of commodity’s fetish character and the noble savage’s putative
ambivalence towards the spectral. This denunciation of seduction by the
spectral rests on a more fundamental distrust of representation as such.
Wrote Baudrillard, the melancholic, fatalist prophet of Postmodernism:
‘‘[A]t stake has always been the murderous capacity of images,
murderers of the real, murderers of their own model... To this mur-
derous capacity is opposed the dialectical capacity of representa-
tions as a visible and intelligible mediation of the Real. All of
Western faith ... was engaged in this wager on representation: that
a sign could refer to the depth of meaning, that a sign could
exchange for meaning, and that something could guarantee this
exchange – God, of course. But what if God himself can be simu-
lated, that is to say, reduced to the signs which attest his existence?
Then the whole system becomes weightless, it is no longer anything
but a gigantic simulacrum – not unreal, but a simulacrum, never
again exchanging for what is real, but exchanging in itself, in an
uninterrupted circuit without reference or circumference.’’62
Debord-dada, as we would say in Bengali, is more direct: ‘‘Whenever
representation takes on an independent existence, the spectacle estab-
lishes its rule.’’63 What underlies the Marxist critique of commodity as
‘fetish’, a category Marx picked up directly from Enlightenment
anthropology of religion, is precisely a denunciation of the simulacra
which links Marx, to an unbroken line of tradition which runs from
Plato to the Romantics through the Schoolmen and Luther. There is a
persistent and morally valorized ontological opposition throughout the
Western tradition between likeness and presence, between things fab-
ricated by man and those given by nature or god. We recall in Plato’s
Sophist a clear-cut distinction between two kinds of images: copies and
simulacra. The copies are good images, the icons which resemble from
within while simulacra are bad and false images. Copies embody pres-
ence, simulacra is mere likeness with no reassuring presence to back it. It
is a copy without an original. Deleuze writes: ‘‘[W]ith Plato a philo-
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sophical decision of the utmost importance was taken’’: that the
phantasm or simulacra is the devil, the Sophist, that always disguised
and displaced false pretender as opposed to god, the demiurge, the only
true and authentic ‘maker’.64
The reason behind my cursory harangue into philosophy is strictly
polemical. Recently, William Pietz has attempted to restore to fetish its
historically speciﬁc meaning(s).65 Pietz’s philological point about the
semantic broadening of ‘fetish’ in the course of Euro-African ﬁrst
encounter is well taken but the import of this philological ‘discovery’ is
not as radical as he supposes: all sorts ofworldly ‘illusions’ about the ‘real’
nature of things are already taken care of in Plato’s ‘simulacra’. Pietz is
traversing the same Platonic path in thinking that the ‘‘untranscended
materiality’’ of res can be taken as an ontological ground, a transcen-
dental signiﬁed, against which is to be measured its various ‘objective’
(mis)representations like ‘commodity fetishism’. The distinction between
materiality and its representation is of course a distinction between two
signiﬁeds (not between a representation and a referent), involving a
characteristically rhetorical production of ‘materiality-eﬀect’.
Enlightenment anthropology’s derogatory term ‘fetish’, deriving from
the Latin adjective facticius (root-meaning: man-made or artiﬁcial), has a
long genealogy. It is not the semantic history of a word but the continuity
of a certain substratum of meaning that concerns me. It began its career
as simulacra in Plato to be used later by Schoolmen (‘‘Thou shalt not
make graven images.’’). Icons ﬂourished under Christianity but not as
presence but as likeness.66 The icons and idols of the heathens (often
referred as ‘fetish’) – claiming to embody not just likeness but also
presence – crumbled as soon as Jesus entered the scene. After Refor-
mation, Protestant philosophers condemned all erstwhile icons and
images, including those of the Catholics, as idolatry, as fetish. Koerner
has demonstrated brilliantly how the Reformation image incorporated a
certain reﬂexivity such that the icon itself became iconoclastic.67 It takes
little imagination to see why fetish became a key term for condemning
the practices of the heathens in early colonial encounters and ﬁnally,
institutionalized as an object of study through academic anthropology
around 1800. It is at this point that Marx picked it up as a category to
demystify the ‘idolatry’ of commodity in modern societies. Thus, there is
a red thread of discursive continuity from Plato to Marx: ‘fetish’ is
tainted. Its cutting edge derives from the Ur-Pra¨senz of an origin, an
Ur-Modell, and the priority of themodel over the copy, whose untruth is
measured precisely by its deviation from the original. Use-value, the self-
same and the self-identical, original and authentic substantiality of
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things as things, is the origin of value. Exchange-value is the false pre-
tender, the Sophist. What I am trying to do is to unyoke the theorization
of commodity from these metaphysical presumptions.
Commodity has a location, it is not the same thing everywhere: it is
ontologically heterogeneous. There is a certain speciﬁcity of my villag-
ers’ entanglement with ‘foren’ commodities: far from epitomizing
people’s powerlessness and lack of control over their own destinies, here
the bicycles function as tangible and public celebrations of power of the
dispossessed. Following Jane Bennett, the question 1 wish to pose is:
‘‘what are the implications for politics when consumables appear as
animate, as politically and symbolically valorized?’’68
Marx’s critique of fetishism hinges crucially on the Cartesian char-
acterization of matter as res whose innate character is inert. This sup-
ports an onto-story in which agency is concentrated only in humans. I
see the Chinese bicycle as expressive of a diﬀerent ontology: in it, the
liveliness of politicized matter itself is at once apparent, by the grace of
the technology of media (hybrid, simulated rumor) and the political
technology of producing citizens. These bicycles thus emerge from a
subversive, underground cultural sense of porosity between things and
persons, from a culture of ‘transaction’ grounded in a diﬀerent set of
notions of property, possession and person. Out of the commercialized
beckoning of Chinese bicycles erupts a cosmology where the self is not
an interiority, something one owns, but a node in a network where the
paradigmatic altruism/selﬁshness, human/non-human divides are
unobtrusively but incontrovertibly breached.
I have tried to underscore the lack of ready availability of a (meta)
narrative called ‘commodity’ in appropriating the kind of intransigence
coded in my Chinese bicycles. This intransigence is also productive in
interrogating the theories of location which ontologise the global as
ground. Finally, it is this intransigence that calls into question the
generalized denunciation of commodity and the spectral. It is the media
simulated spectral that activates discordant imaginaries of vernacular
globalization, glaringly at odds with the bloodless vision of ‘global civil
society’.
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